Telecommunication Policy for the Information Age: From Monopoly to Competition by Gerald W. BrockTelecommunication Policy for the Information Age: From Monopoly to Competition by Gerald W. Brock

Telecommunication Policy for the Information Age: From Monopoly to Competition

byGerald W. Brock

Paperback | September 1, 1998

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Gerald Brock develops a new theory of decentralized public decisionmaking and uses it to clarify the dramatic changes that have transformed the telecommunication industry from a heavily regulated monopoly to a set of market-oriented firms. He demonstrates how the decentralized decisionmaking process--whose apparent element of chaos has so often invited criticism--has actually made the United States a world leader in reforming telecommunication policy.

Gerald W. Brock is Professor of Telecommunication and Director of the Graduate Telecommunication Program at George Washington University, and was previously Common Carrier Bureau Chief at the Federal Communications Commission.
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Title:Telecommunication Policy for the Information Age: From Monopoly to CompetitionFormat:PaperbackDimensions:336 pagesPublished:September 1, 1998Publisher:HarvardLanguage:English

The following ISBNs are associated with this title:

ISBN - 10:0674873262

ISBN - 13:9780674873261

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Table of Contents

Introduction

Positive Results of the Decentralized Process

Potential Benefits of a Decentralized Policy Process

Plan of the Book

Perspectives on the Policy Process

Blackstone versus Bentham

Landis versus Stigler

Information Economics and Transaction Costs

Preferences and Principles

A Model of the Decentralized Policy Process

The Coordination of Decentralized Public Policy and of Scientific Research

The Structure of the Decentralized Policy Model

Examples of the Decentralized Policy Model

Institutions of Telecommunication Policy

The Communications Act of 1934

The Structure of the FCC

Non-FCC Policy Institutions

Economic Characteristics of the Telecommunication Industry

The Development of Telephone Monopoly

Regulation and the Sharing of Toll Revenue

The 1956 Consent Decree

Interconnection and the Network Externality

THE DEVELOPMENT OF COMPETITION

Competition in Terminal Equipment

Hush-A-Phone

Carterfone

Protective Connecting Arrangements

Opposition to Terminal Competition

Computer II and Detariffing

Initial Long Distance Competition

Bulk Private Service: "Above 890"

MCI Initial Application

Specialized Common Carrier Competition

Interconnection and Long Distance Competition

The Private Line Interconnection Controversy

AT&T's Rate Response to Private Line Competition

Execunet and Switched Services Competition

Interconnection Charges: ENFIA

Competition under the ENFIA Agreement

STRUCTURAL BOUNDARIES

The Divestiture

The Consumer Communications Reform Act

The Antitrust Suit

The Reagan Administration'sPerspectives

The Divestiture Agreement

Implementing the Divestiture

Access Charges: A Confusing Ten Billion Dollar Game

The First Plan: Pre-Divestiture Agreement

The 1982 Access Plan

Separations Reform and High-Cost Subsidy

The Implementation of Access Charges

Congressional Influence on Access Charges

Initial Switched Access Charge

Managed Competition for Political Perceptions

Completion of the Access Charge Plan

ALTERNATIVES TO THE DIVESTITURE MODEL

The Dismantling of Structural Separation

The Third Computer Inquiry

The DOJ and the MFJ Information Services Restriction

Judge Greene and the Information Services Restriction

Competition in Local Service

Network Issues with Local Competition

Local Competition and Interconnection

Price Caps and Regulatory BoundariesThe First Plan: Bridge to Deregulation

The Revised Plan: Better Regulation

Political Issues in the AT&T Price Cap Plan

The LEC Price Cap Plan

Conclusion

The Evolution of Telecommunication Policy

Fact Perceptions Incorporated into Policy

Policy Goals

Notes

Index

From Our Editors

Will the rush of the information super-highway leave U.S. telecommunication policy in the dust - or will our policy keep pace with and effectively regulate the future of telecommunication? Former FCC Bureau Chief Gerald Brock argues that the existing agencies with overlapping responsibilities can set policies that will wisely steer the telecommunication industry through the high-speed changes just around the corner. Brock develops a new theory of decentralized public decision-making and uses it to clarify the dramatic changes that have transformed the industry from a heavily regulated monopoly to a set of market-oriented finds. In a uniquely authoritative, up-to-date history of telecommunication policy - informed in part by his firsthand experience - the author looks at decisions made by the FCC, state regulatory agencies, the Department of Justice, Congress, and federal courts. He demonstrates how the decentralized decision-making process - whose apparent element of chaos has so often invited criticism - has actually made the United States a world leader in refor

Editorial Reviews

IntroductionPositive Results of the Decentralized ProcessPotential Benefits of a Decentralized Policy ProcessPlan of the BookPerspectives on the Policy ProcessBlackstone versus BenthamLandis versus StiglerInformation Economics and Transaction CostsPreferences and PrinciplesA Model of the Decentralized Policy ProcessThe Coordination of Decentralized Public Policy and of Scientific ResearchThe Structure of the Decentralized Policy ModelExamples of the Decentralized Policy ModelInstitutions of Telecommunication PolicyThe Communications Act of 1934The Structure of the FCCNon-FCC Policy InstitutionsEconomic Characteristics of the Telecommunication IndustryThe Development of Telephone MonopolyRegulation and the Sharing of Toll RevenueThe 1956 Consent DecreeInterconnection and the Network ExternalityTHE DEVELOPMENT OF COMPETITIONCompetition in Terminal EquipmentHush-A-PhoneCarterfoneProtective Connecting ArrangementsOpposition to Terminal CompetitionComputer II and DetariffingInitial Long Distance CompetitionBulk Private Service: "Above 890"MCI Initial ApplicationSpecialized Common Carrier CompetitionInterconnection and Long Distance CompetitionThe Private Line Interconnection ControversyAT&T's Rate Response to Private Line CompetitionExecunet and Switched Services CompetitionInterconnection Charges: ENFIACompetition under the ENFIA AgreementSTRUCTURAL BOUNDARIESThe DivestitureThe Consumer Communications Reform ActThe Antitrust SuitThe Reagan Administration'sPerspectivesThe Divestiture AgreementImplementing the DivestitureAccess Charges: A Confusing Ten Billion Dollar GameThe First Plan: Pre-Divestiture AgreementThe 1982 Access PlanSeparations Reform and High-Cost SubsidyThe Implementation of Access ChargesCongressional Influence on Access ChargesInitial Switched Access ChargeManaged Competition for Political PerceptionsCompletion of the Access Charge PlanALTERNATIVES TO THE DIVESTITURE MODELThe Dismantling of Structural SeparationThe Third Computer InquiryThe DOJ and the MFJ Information Services RestrictionJudge Greene and the Information Services RestrictionCompetition in Local ServiceNetwork Issues with Local CompetitionLocal Competition and InterconnectionPrice Caps and Regulatory BoundariesThe First Plan: Bridge to DeregulationThe Revised Plan: Better RegulationPolitical Issues in the AT&T Price Cap PlanThe LEC Price Cap PlanConclusionThe Evolution of Telecommunication PolicyFact Perceptions Incorporated into PolicyPolicy GoalsNotesIndexAmerica's choices of policy toward telecommunication triggered a revolutionary reorganization and gain in this sector's efficiency, first in the United States, but prospectively worldwide. Brock's book carefully traces the decentralized policymaking process that brought this revolution about. It advances the existing literature in many ways, notably in a clear and comprehensive analysis of the role of network externalities.