The Domain of Reasons by John SkorupskiThe Domain of Reasons by John Skorupski

The Domain of Reasons

byJohn Skorupski

Paperback | December 1, 2012

Pricing and Purchase Info


Earn 361 plum® points

Prices and offers may vary in store


In stock online

Ships free on orders over $25

Not available in stores


This book is about normativity and reasons. By the end, however, the subject becomes the relation between self, thought, and world. If we understand normativity, we are on the road to understanding this relation. John Skorupski argues that all normative properties are reducible to reason relations, so that the sole normative ingredient in any normative concept is the concept of a reason. This is a concept fundamental to all thought. It is pervasive (actions, beliefs, and sentiments all fall within itsrange), primitive (all other normative concepts are reducible to it), and constitutive of the idea of thought itself. Thinking is sensitivity to reasons. Thought in the full sense of autonomous cognition is possible only for a being sensitive to reasons and capable of deliberating about them. In Part II of the book Skorupski examines epistemic reasons, and shows that aprioricity, necessity, evidence, and probability, which may not seem to be normative at all, are in fact normative concepts analysable in terms of the concept of a reason. In Part III he shows the same for the concept of aperson's good, and for moral concepts including the concept of a right. Part IV moves to the epistemology and metaphysics of reasons. When we make claims about reasons to believe, reasons to feel, or reasons to act we are asserting genuine propositions: judgeable, truth-apt contents. But thesenormative propositions must be distinguished from factual propositions, for they do not represent states of affairs. So Skorupski's ambitious theory of normativity has broad and deep implications for philosophy. It shows how reflection on the logic, epistemology, and ontology of reasons finally leads us to an account of the interplay of self, thought, and world.
John Skorupski is Professor of Moral Philosophy at the University of St Andrews.
Title:The Domain of ReasonsFormat:PaperbackDimensions:558 pages, 9.61 × 6.69 × 0.03 inPublished:December 1, 2012Publisher:Oxford University PressLanguage:English

The following ISBNs are associated with this title:

ISBN - 10:0199664676

ISBN - 13:9780199664672

Look for similar items by category:


Table of Contents

PrefaceSynopsis1. IntroductionPart One: The Structure of Normative Concepts2. Reasons3. Indexicality, Universalisability and the Range of Reasons4. Normativity5. WarrantPart Two: Epistemic Reasons6. The A Priori7. Analyticity8. Modality9. Non-monotonic NormsPart Three: Evaluative and Practical Reasons10. Rational Explanation: Belief, Feeling and Will11. Reasons and Feelings: (i) The Bridge Principle and the Concept of a Person's Good12. Reasons and Feelings: (ii) Moral Concepts13. Impartiality (i) The Principle of Good14. Impartiality (ii) The Demand Principle15. Moral Judgement and FeelingPart Four: The Normative View16. The Epistemology of Reason Relations17. The Ontology of Reason Relations18. Rules, Norms and Concepts19. Self and Self-Determination20. The Critique of ReasonsAppendix: Symbols, Terms and ThesesReferencesIndex

Editorial Reviews

Review from previous edition: "as historically rich as it is philosophically illuminating ... on a par with the most significant books on reasons, normativity and the mind published in recent years." --Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews