The Economics Of Information: Lying and Cheating in Markets and Organizations by Ian MolhoThe Economics Of Information: Lying and Cheating in Markets and Organizations by Ian Molho

The Economics Of Information: Lying and Cheating in Markets and Organizations

byIan Molho

Paperback | October 31, 1997

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about

Knowledge is a vital resource which confers strategic advantages on those that possess it, and provides the possibility of misuse and abuse with increasingly dangerous economic consequences.
Ian Molho is Reader in Applied Microeconomics in the Department of Economics, University of Newcastle. He was previously a research fellow at the University of Kent and his varied research interests include labor markets, game theory, the economics of information and evolutionary economics.
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Title:The Economics Of Information: Lying and Cheating in Markets and OrganizationsFormat:PaperbackDimensions:276 pages, 9.1 × 6 × 0.77 inPublished:October 31, 1997Publisher:Wiley

The following ISBNs are associated with this title:

ISBN - 10:0631206663

ISBN - 13:9780631206668

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Table of Contents

List of Figures.

List of Tables.

Preface.

1. Introduction: Private Information and Hidden Action.

Part I: Adverse Selection: The Market for Lemons. .

2. Quality Uncertainty and the Market for Lemons.

3. Adverse Selection: The Wilson Model.

4. Lemons Problems: Experimental Evidence.

Part II: Signalling.

5. Job Market Signalling.

6. Screening: A Self-Selection Mechanism.

7. Further Literature on Signalling Theory.

8. Signalling/Screening Behaviour: Experimental Evidence.

Part III: Moral Hazard.

9. Moral Hazard: Shareholder/Management Relations.

10. Moral Hazard: A Principal-Agent Model.

11. Further Literature on Moral Hazard and Agency Theory.

12. Moral Hazard: Experimental Evidence.

Part IV: Mechanism Design: Applications to Bargaining and Auctions. .

13. Mechanism Design and the Revelation Principle: A Bargaining Example.

14. Auction Design: Theory.

15. Auction Design: Experimental Evidence.

16. Concluding Comments.

Appendix: Brief Notes on Probability Distributions, Baye's Rule, Expected Utility Theory and Game Theory.

Index.