The Handbook of Market Design by Nir Vulkan

The Handbook of Market Design

EditorNir Vulkan, Alvin E. Roth, Zvika Neeman

Paperback | December 2, 2015

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Economists often look at markets as given, and try to make predictions about who will do what and what will happen in these markets. Market design, by contrast, does not take markets as given; instead, it combines insights from economic and game theory together with common sense and lessonslearned from empirical work and experimental analysis to aid in the design and implementation of actual markets. In recent years the field has grown dramatically, partially because of the successful wave of spectrum auctions in the US and in Europe, which have been designed by a number of prominenteconomists, and partially because of the increase use of the Internet as the platform over which markets are designed and run. There is now a large number of applications and a growing theoretical literature. The Handbook of Market Design brings together the latest research from leading experts to provide a comprehensive description of applied market design over the last two decades. In particular, it surveys matching markets: environments where there is a need to match large two-sided populations to oneanother, such as medical residents and hospitals, law clerks and judges, or patients and kidney donors. It also examines a number of applications related to electronic markets, e-commerce, and the effect of the Internet on competition between exchanges.

About The Author

Nir Vulkan is an Economics Professor at the Said Business School and a Fellow of Worcester College, Oxford University. He has written many articles on market design and is author of The Economics of E- Commerce (Princeton University Press, 2003). He has worked with many software and e-commerce companies designing markets mainly on the ...

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Title:The Handbook of Market DesignFormat:PaperbackDimensions:720 pages, 9.69 × 6.73 × 0.01 inPublished:December 2, 2015Publisher:Oxford University PressLanguage:English

The following ISBNs are associated with this title:

ISBN - 10:0198743777

ISBN - 13:9780198743774

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Table of Contents

Nir Vulkan, Alvin E. Roth, and Zvika Neeman: IntroductionPart I: General Principles1. Alvin E. Roth: What Have We Learned From Market Design?2. Gary E. Bolton: Not Up To Standard: Stress Testing Market Designs for Misbehavior3. Paul Klemperer: Using and Abusing Auction TheoryPart II: CasesSection II.A: Matching Markets4. Tayfun Sonmez and Utku Unver: Market Design for Kidney Exchange5. Atila Abdulkadiroglu: School Choice6. Aytek Erdil and Haluk Ergin: Improving Efficiency in School Choice7. Sarbartha Bandyopadhyay, Fedor Iskhakov, Terence Johnson, Soohyung Lee, David McArthur, John Rust, Joel Watson, and John Watson: Can the Job Market for Economists be Improved?8. Joshua S. Gans and Scott Stern: Designing Markets for Ideas9. Ashok Rai and Tomas Sjostrom: Redesigning MicrocreditSection II.B: Auctions10. Paul Klemperer: The Product-Mix Auction: A New Auction Design for Differentiated Goods11. Robert Day and Paul Milgrom: Optimal Incentives in Core-Selecting Auctions12. Peter Cramton, Samuel Dinkin, and Robert Wilson: Auctioning Rough Diamonds: A Competitive Sales Process for BHP Billiton's Ekati DiamondsSection II.C: E-Commerce13. Axel Ockenfels and Alvin E. Roth: Ending Rules in Internet Auctions: Design and Behavior14. Andrew Byde and Nir Vulkan: Designing Markets for Mixed Use of Humans and Automated Agents15. Benjamin Edelman: The Design of Online Advertising Markets16. Tuomas Sandholm: Very-Large-Scale Generalized Combinatorial Multi-Attribute Auctions: Lessons from Conducting $60 Billion of Sourcing17. Nir Vulkan and Chris Priest: Designing Automated Markets for Communication BandwithSection II.D: Law Design18. Alon Klement and Zvika Neeman: A Mechanism Design Approach to Legal Problems19. Aviad Heifetz, Ella Segev, and Eric Talley: Legislation with Endogenous PreferencesPart III: Experiments20. Lawrence M. Ausubel, Peter Cramton, Emel Filiz-Ozbay, Nathaniel Higgins, Erkut Y. Ozbay, and Andrew Stocking: Common-Value Auctions with Liquidity Needs: An Experimental Test of a Troubled Assets Reverse Auction21. Martin Dufwenberg and Uri Gneezy: Information Disclosure in Auctions: An Experiment22. Elena Katok: Experiments with Buyer-Determined Procurement Auctions23. Uri Gneezy, Ernan Haruvy, and Hadas Yaffe: The Inefficiency of Splitting the BillPart IV: Competing Designs24. Michael Peters: Competing Mechanisms25. Nir Vulkan and Zvika Neeman: Three Case Studies of Competing Designs in Financial Markets