The Impact of Incomplete Contracts on Economics

Paperback | February 4, 2016

EditorPhilippe Aghion, Mathias Dewatripont, Patrick Legros

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The 1986 article by Grossman and Hart "A Theory of Vertical and Lateral Integration" has provided a framework for understanding how firm boundaries are defined and how they affect economic performance. The property rights approach has provided a formal way to introduce incomplete contractingideas into economic modeling. The Impact of Incomplete Contracts on Economics collects papers and opinion pieces on the impact that this property right approach to the firm has had on the economics profession. It shows that the impact has been felt sometimes in significant ways in a variety of fields, ranging from the theory ofthe firm and their internal organization to industrial organization, international trade, finance, management, public economy, and political economy and political science. Beyond acknowledging how the property rights approach has permeated economics as a whole, the contributions in the book alsohighlight the road ahead - how the paradigm may change the way research is performed in some of the fields, and what type of research is still missing. The book concludes with a discussion of the foundations of the property rights, and more generally the incomplete contracting, approaches and with aseries of contributions showing how behavioral considerations may provide a new way forward.

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The 1986 article by Grossman and Hart "A Theory of Vertical and Lateral Integration" has provided a framework for understanding how firm boundaries are defined and how they affect economic performance. The property rights approach has provided a formal way to introduce incomplete contractingideas into economic modeling. The Impact of I...

Philippe Aghion is the Robert C. Waggoner Professor of Economics at Harvard University and a fellow of the Econometric Society and of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences. His research focuses on the economics of growth. With Peter Howitt, he pioneered the so-called Schumpeterian Growth paradigm which was subsequently used to anal...

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Format:PaperbackDimensions:440 pages, 9.25 × 6.12 × 0.68 inPublished:February 4, 2016Publisher:Oxford University PressLanguage:English

The following ISBNs are associated with this title:

ISBN - 10:0199826218

ISBN - 13:9780199826216

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Table of Contents

PART 1: Perspectives on Grossman and Hart 19861. John Moore: Introductory Remarks on Grossman and Hart, JPE, 19862. Bengt Holmstrom: Grossman-Hart (1986) as a Theory of Markets3. Jean Tirole: Remarks on Incomplete Contracting4. Steven Tadelis: Property Rights and Transaction Cost Theories5. Thomas Hubbard: Grossman and Hart (1986) and Applied TheoryPART 2: Incomplete Contracts and Firm Boundaries6. Wouter Dessein: Incomplete Contracts and Firm Boundaries: New Directions7. Francine Lafontaine: Discussion of Wouter Dessein's "Incomplete Contracts and Firm Boundaries: New Directions"8. Michael D. Whinston: Comment on "Incomplete contracts and Firm Boundaries: New Directions" by Wouter DesseinPART 3: Incomplete Contracts and Internal Organization9. Phillipe Aghion, Nicholas Bloom, and John Van Reenen: Incomplete Contracts and the Internal Organization of Firms10. P. John Roberts: Comments on Aghion, Bloom and Van Reenen "Incomplete Contracts and the Internal Organization of Firms,"11. P. Aghion, N. Bloom and J. Van Reenen W. Bentley McLeod: The Empirical Implications of the Grossman-Hart Model: Comments on "Incomplete Contracts an the Internal Organization of Firms"PART 4: Incomplete Contracts and Corporate Finance12. Patrick Bolton: Corporate Finance, Incomplete Contracts, and Corporate Control13. Efraim Benmelech: Discussion of Patrick Bolton's "Corporate Finance, Incomplete Contracts, and Corporate Control"14. Luigi Zingales: Why Incomplete Contract is Important for FinancePART 5: Incomplete Contracts and Business Firms15. Josh Lemer: Oliver Hart's Contributions to the Understanding of Strategic Alliances and Technology Licensing16. Steve Kaplan: Incomplete Contracts and Venture Capital17. Jeremy C. Stein: Incomplete Contracts and the Role of Small FirmsPART 6: Incomplete Contracts and Industrial Organization18. Patrick Legros and Andrew F. Newman: Contracts, Ownership and Industrial Organization: Past and Future19. Mathias Dewatripont: Discussion of "Contracts, Ownership and Industrial Organization: Past and Future", by Patrick Legros and Andrew Newman20. Kai-Uwe Khn: Discussion of "Contracts, Ownership and Industrial Organization: Past and Future", by Patrick Legros and Andrew NewmanPART 7: Incomplete Contracts and International Trade21. Pol Antres: Grossman-Hart (1986) Goes Global: Incomplete Contracts, Property Rights, and the International Organization of Production22. Elhanan Helpman: Comment on Pol AntrELs: "Grossman-Hart (1986) Goes Global: Incomplete Contracts, Property Rights, and the International Organization of Production"23. Dalia Marin: The Theory of the Firm Goes GlobalPART 8: Incomplete Contracts and Public Ownership24. Paul Grout: Incomplete Contracts and Not for Profit Firms25. Henry Hansmann: Firm Ownership: The Legacy of Grossman and Hart26. Rohan Pitchford: Ex-Ante Anonymity and Government Allocation of Property RightsPART 9: Incomplete Contracts and Political Economy27. Bard Harstad: International Treaties as Incomplete Contracts28. Gerard Roland: Incomplete Contracts and Political Economy29. Guido Tabellini: Incomplete Contracts and the Design of ConstitutionsPART 10: Incomplete Contracts, Mechanism Design and Complexity30. Eric Maskin: Comments on the Foundations of Incomplete Contracts31. John Moore: Comments on the Foundations of Incomplete Contracts32. Richard Holden: Incomplete Contracts and Mechanism Design33. Nabil I. Al-Najjar, Luca Anderlini, and Leonardo Felli: Complexity and UndescribabilityPART 11: Incomplete Contracts, Reference Points and Communication34. Christian Zehnder: New Directions of Incomplete Contracts: Reference Points, Communication, and Renegotiation35. Klaus Schmidt: Some Recent Experimental Evidence on Contracts as Reference Points36. Antoinette Schoar: Incomplete Contracting in the Field