The Institutional Structure of Antitrust Enforcement by Daniel A. CraneThe Institutional Structure of Antitrust Enforcement by Daniel A. Crane

The Institutional Structure of Antitrust Enforcement

byDaniel A. Crane

Hardcover | February 17, 2011

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The Institutional Structure of Antitrust Enforcement, by Daniel A. Crane provides a comprehensive and succinct treatment of the history, structure, and behavior of the various U.S. institutions that enforce antitrust laws, such as the Department of Justice and the Federal Trade Commission. Itaddresses the relationship between corporate regulation and antitrust, the uniquely American approach of having two federal antitrust agencies, antitrust federalism, and the predominance of private enforcement over public enforcement. It also draws comparisons with the structure of institutionalenforcement outside the United States in the European Union and in other parts of the world, and it considers the possibility of creating international antitrust institutions through the World Trade Organization or other treaty mechanisms. The book derives its topics from historical, economic,political, and theoretical perspectives.
Daniel A. Crane is a law professor at the University of Michigan, where he teaches contracts, antitrust, and antitrust and intellectual property. His scholarship has focused primarily on antitrust and economic regulation, particularly the institutional structure of antitrust enforcement, predatory pricing, bundling, and the antitrust ...
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Title:The Institutional Structure of Antitrust EnforcementFormat:HardcoverDimensions:292 pages, 9.25 × 6.12 × 0.98 inPublished:February 17, 2011Publisher:Oxford University PressLanguage:English

The following ISBNs are associated with this title:

ISBN - 10:0195372654

ISBN - 13:9780195372656

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Table of Contents

AcknowledgmentsIntroductionPart I - Origins and Development of U.S. Antitrust Institutions1. Antifederalism and Corporate Regulation2. The Curious Case of Dual Federal Enforcement3. Private Enforcement: Growth and Backlash4. Shifting Towards TechnocracyPart II - Optimizing Institutional Performance5. Adjudication, Regulation, and Administration6. The Much-Maligned Antitrust Jury7. Improving Public Enforcement8. State Enforcement and Federal Preemption9. Rethinking Private EnforcementPart III - Comparative and International Perspectives10. How and Why is Europe Different?11. Emerging Antitrust Institutions Around the World12. Toward International Antitrust Institutions?Index