The Logic of Strategy by Cristina Bicchieri

The Logic of Strategy

EditorCristina Bicchieri, Richard Jeffrey, Brian Skyrms

Hardcover | October 1, 1998

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Edited by three leading figures in the field, this exciting volume presents cutting-edge work in decision theory by a distinguished international roster of contributors. These mostly unpublished papers address a host of crucial areas in the contemporary philosophical study of rationality andknowledge. Topics include causal versus evidential decision theory, game theory, backwards induction, bounded rationality, counterfactual reasoning in games and in general, analyses of the famous common knowledge assumptions in game theory, and evaluations of the normal versus extensive formformulations of complex decision problems.

About The Author

Cristina Bicchieri is at Carnegie Mellon University. Richard Jeffrey is at Princeton University.

Details & Specs

Title:The Logic of StrategyFormat:HardcoverDimensions:208 pages, 9.29 × 6.18 × 0.79 inPublished:October 1, 1998Publisher:Oxford University Press

The following ISBNs are associated with this title:

ISBN - 10:0195117158

ISBN - 13:9780195117158

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Table of Contents

Cristina Bichieri, Richard Jeffrey, Brian Skyrms: What is the Logic Strategy?List of ContributorsRobert Steinaker: Knowledge, Belief and Counterfactual Reasoning in GamesPeter J. Hammond: Consequentialism, Non-Archimedean Probabilities and Lexicographic Expected UtilityWilliam Harper: Solutions Based on Ratifiability and Sure Thing ReasoningAndre Fuhrmann and Isaac Levi: Undercutting the Ramsey Test for ConditionalsMatthais Hild, Richard Jeffrey and Mathais Risse: Aumann's "No Agreement" Theorem GeneralizedTimothy Williamson: Rational Failures of the KK-PrincipleHyun Song Shin and Timothy Williamson: How Much Common Belief is Necessary for a Convention?Michael Bacharach, Hyun Song Shin, and Mark Williams: Sophisticated Bounded Agents Play the Repeated DilemmaItzhak Gilboa: Can Free Choice Be Known?Cristina Bicchieri and Mitchell S. Green: Symmetry Arguments for Cooperation in the Prisoner's Dilemma