The Missing Link in Cognition: Origins of Self-Reflective Consciousness by Herbert S. TerraceThe Missing Link in Cognition: Origins of Self-Reflective Consciousness by Herbert S. Terrace

The Missing Link in Cognition: Origins of Self-Reflective Consciousness

EditorHerbert S. Terrace, Janet Metcalfe

Hardcover | June 22, 2005

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Are humans unique in having self-reflective consciousness? Or can precursors to this central form of human consciousness be found in non-human species? The Missing Link in Cognition brings together a diverse group of researchers who have been investigating this question from a variety ofperspectives, including the extent to which non-human primates, and, indeed, young children, have consciousness, a sense of self, thought process, metacognitions, and representations. Some of the participants--Kitcher, Higgins, Nelson, and Tulving--argue that these types of cognitive abilities areuniquely human, whereas others--Call, Hampton, Kinsbourne, Menzel, Metcalfe, Schwartz, Smith, and Terrace--are convinced that at least the precursors to self-reflective consciousness exist in non-human primates.Their debate focuses primarily on the underpinnings of consciousness. Some of the participants believe that consciousness depends on representational thought and on the mental manipulation of such representations. Is representational thought enough to ensure consciousness, or does one need more?If one needs more, exactly what is needed? Is reflection upon the representations, that is, metacognition, the link? Does a realization of the contingencies, that is, "knowing that," in Gilbert Ryle's terminology, ensure that a person or an animal is conscious? Is true episodic memory needed forconsciousness, and if so, do any animals have it? Is it possible to have episodic memory or, indeed, any self-reflective processing, without language?Other participants believe that consciousness is inextricably intertwined with a sense of self or self-awareness. From where does this sense of self or self-awareness arise? Some of the participants believe that it develops only through the use of language and the narrative form. If it doesdevelop in this way, what about claims of a sense of self or self-awareness in non-human animals? Others believe that the autobiographical record implied by episodic memory is fundamental. To what extent must non-human animals have the linguistic, metacognitive, and/or representational abilitiesto develop a sense of self or self-awareness? These and other related concerns are crucial in this volume's lively debate over the nature of the missing cognitive link, and whether gorillas, chimps, or other species might be more like humans than many have supposed.
Janet Metcalfe is at Columbia University.
Title:The Missing Link in Cognition: Origins of Self-Reflective ConsciousnessFormat:HardcoverDimensions:392 pages, 6.42 × 9.29 × 0.98 inPublished:June 22, 2005Publisher:Oxford University PressLanguage:English

The following ISBNs are associated with this title:

ISBN - 10:0195161564

ISBN - 13:9780195161564


Table of Contents

1. Endel Tulving: Episodic memory and autonoesis: Uniquely human?2. Janet Metcalfe and Hedy Kober: Self-reflective consciousness and the projectable self3. Herbert S. Terrace: Metacognition and the evolution of language4. Katherine Nelson: Emerging levels of consciousness in early human development5. Marcel Kinsbourne: A continuum of self-consciousness that emerges in phylogeny and ontogeny6. E. Tory Higgins: Humans as applied motivation scientists: Self-consciousness from "Shared Reality" and "Becoming"7. Patricia Kitcher: Two normative roles for self-consciousness in modern philosophy8. Bennett L. Schwartz: Progress in the study of chimpanzee recall and episodic memory9. Bennett L. Schwartz: Do non-human primates have episodic memory10. J. David Smith: Studies of uncertainty monitoring and metacognition in animals and humans11. Robert R. Hampton: Can Rhesus monkeys discriminate between remembering and forgetting?12. Lisa K. Son and Nate Kornell: Meta-confidence judgements in Rhesus Macaques: Explicit versus implicit mechanisms13. Joseph Call: The self and other: A missing link in comparative social cognition

Editorial Reviews

"Just when you thought it was safe to proclaim our intellectual uniqueness and domination of the animal kingdom, along comes The Missing Link in Cognition, the latest challenge to our status as the paragon of animals."--Marc Hauser, Harvard University