The Non-Reality of Free Will by Richard Double

The Non-Reality of Free Will

byRichard Double

Hardcover | April 1, 1990

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The traditional disputants in the free will discussion--the libertarian, soft determinist, and hard determinist--agree that free will is a coherent concept, while disagreeing on how the concept might be satisfied and whether it can, in fact, be satisfied. In this innovative analysis, RichardDouble offers a bold new argument, rejecting all of the traditional theories and proposing that the concept of free will cannot be satisfied, no matter what the nature of reality. Arguing that there is unavoidable conflict within our understanding of moral responsibility and free choice, Doubleseeks to prove that when we ascribe responsibility, blame, or freedom, we merely express attitudes, rather than state anything capable of truth or falsity. Free will, he concludes, is essentially an incoherent notion.

About The Author

Richard Double is at Edinboro University of Pennsylvania.
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Title:The Non-Reality of Free WillFormat:HardcoverDimensions:272 pages, 8.5 × 5.75 × 0.94 inPublished:April 1, 1990Publisher:Oxford University Press

The following ISBNs are associated with this title:

ISBN - 10:0195064976

ISBN - 13:9780195064971

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"In this excellent work, Richard Double has accomplished at least two very important things: (1)He's shown that we just can't have the whole ball of wax regarding freely chosen behavior, which, despite inchoate suspicions to the contrary, so many of us have always wanted. (2)Regardingordinary ascriptions of free choice and moral responsibility, he's forced the discussion onto a much higher plane than it has previously enjoyed."--Peter Unger, New York University