The Oxford Handbook of International Antitrust Economics, Volume 2 by Roger D. BlairThe Oxford Handbook of International Antitrust Economics, Volume 2 by Roger D. Blair

The Oxford Handbook of International Antitrust Economics, Volume 2

EditorRoger D. Blair, D. Daniel Sokol

Hardcover | November 19, 2014

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More than any other area of regulation, antitrust economics shapes law and policy in the United States, the Americas, Europe, and Asia. In a number of different areas of antitrust, advances in theory and empirical work have caused a fundamental reevaluation and shift of some of the assumptionsbehind antitrust policy. This reevaluation has profound implications for the future of the field.The Oxford Handbook of International Antitrust Economics has collected chapters from many of the leading figures in antitrust. In doing so, this two volume Handbook provides an important reference guide for scholars, teachers, and practitioners. However, it is more than a merely reference guide.Rather, it has a number of different goals. First, it takes stock of the current state of scholarship across a number of different antitrust topics. In doing so, it relies primarily upon the economics scholarship. In some situations, though, there is also coverage of legal scholarship, case lawdevelopments, and legal policies.The second goal of the Handbook is to provide some ideas about future directions of antitrust scholarship and policy. Antitrust economics has evolved over the last 60 years. It has both shaped policy and been shaped by policy. The Oxford Handbook of International Antitrust Economics will serve as apolicy and research guide of next steps to consider when shaping the future of the field of antitrust.
Roger D. Blair is Walter J. Matherly Professor, Department of Economics at the University of Florida where he has taught for 40 years. His research interests center on antitrust economics and policy. In addition to numerous articles in economics journals and law reviews, he has published Law and Economics of Vertical Integration and Co...
Title:The Oxford Handbook of International Antitrust Economics, Volume 2Format:HardcoverDimensions:664 pages, 9.75 × 6.75 × 0.98 inPublished:November 19, 2014Publisher:Oxford University PressLanguage:English

The following ISBNs are associated with this title:

ISBN - 10:0199388598

ISBN - 13:9780199388592


Table of Contents

I. MONOPOLIZATION: CONDUCT1. B. Douglas Bernheim and Randal Heeb: A Framework for the Economic Analysis of Exclusionary Conduct2. Kenneth G. Elzinga and David E. Mills: Predatory Pricing3. David T. Scheffman and Richard S. Higgins: Raising Rivals' Costs4. John E. Lopatka: Predatory Buying5. Kevin M. Murphy, Edward A. Snyder, and Robert H. Topel: Competitive Discounts and Antitrust Policy6. Barak Orbach and Raphael Avraham: Squeezing Claims: Refusals to Deal, Essentials Facilities, and Price Squeezes7. Thomas F. Cotter: Innovation and Antitrust Policy8. Pierre Larouche and Maarten Pieter Schinkel: Continental Drift in the Treatment of Dominant Firms: Article 102 TFEU in Contrast to 2 Sherman Act9. Ping Lin and Hiroshi Ohashi: Treatments of Monopolization in Japan and China10. Alberto Heimler and Kirtikumar Mehta: Monopolization in Developing Countries11. Michael J. Mazzeo and Ryan C. McDevitt: Business Strategy and Antitrust PolicyII. VERTICAL INTEGRATION AND CONTRACTUAL EQUIVALENTS12. Benjamin Klein: Resale Price Maintenance of Online Retailing13. Howard Marvel: Exclusive Dealing14. Erik Hovenkamp and Herbert Hovenkamp: Tying Arrangements15. Ralph A. Winter and Edward M. Iacobucci: Vertical Restraints Across Jurisdictions16. Francine Lafontaine and Margaret E. Slade: Franchising and Exclusive Distribution: Adaptation and AntitrustIII. COLLUSION AMONG OSTENSIBLE COMPETITORS17. Jay Pil Choi and Heiko Gerlach: Cartels and Collusion: Economic Theory and Experimental Economics18. Margaret C. Levenstein and Valerie Y. Suslow: Cartels and Collusion: Empirical Evidence19. Edward J. Green, Robert C. Marshall, and Leslie M. Marx: Tacit Collusion in Oligopoly20. Ken Hendricks, R. Preston McAfee, and Michael A. Williams: Auctions and Bid Rigging21. Michael J. Doane, Luke M. Froeb, David S. Sibley, and Brijesh P. Pinto: Screening for Collusion as a Problem of Inference22. Richard Gilbert: Competition Policy for Industry Standards23. Rosa M. Abrantes-Metz and D. Daniel Sokol: Antitrust Corporate Governance and Compliance