The Political Economy Of Fiscal Decisions: The Strategic Role of Public Debt by Jessica De WolffThe Political Economy Of Fiscal Decisions: The Strategic Role of Public Debt by Jessica De Wolff

The Political Economy Of Fiscal Decisions: The Strategic Role of Public Debt

byJessica De Wolff, J. De Wolff

Paperback | September 17, 1998

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A ruling party decides each of two periods on the level of public goods which it finances by means of taxation and internal debt. The debt has to be honoured by the government of the second period. Between the two periods elections take place, which may change the ruling party.The book analyzes the fiscal decision of the first government which aims to maximize the long run utility of its representative voter. Conditions under which the government uses debt strategically in order to stay in power are identified. It is also shown how the fiscal decisions hinge on the populations' political structure and its beliefs about the future government.
Title:The Political Economy Of Fiscal Decisions: The Strategic Role of Public DebtFormat:PaperbackDimensions:150 pages, 23.5 × 15.5 × 0.17 inPublished:September 17, 1998Publisher:Springer-Verlag/Sci-Tech/TradeLanguage:English

The following ISBNs are associated with this title:

ISBN - 10:3790811300

ISBN - 13:9783790811308

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Table of Contents

Introduction.- The Evolution of Public Debt.- Literature Survey: The Political Economy of the Government Budget: The Tax-Smoothing Theory of the Government Budget; Intergenerational Redistribution; Intragenerational Geographical Redistribution; Government Fragmentation and Duration and the Electoral System; Debt as a Strategic Instrument.- Introduction to the Model: The Model's Time Structure; The Main Novelties of the Model; Further Assumptions of the Model; The Interdependencies of the Model.- The Implivations for Fiscal Policy: A General Example; Fiscal Policy in our Model; The Long Run Utility Function in a General Form and its Derivative with Respect to p; The Optimal Fiscal Policy of an R-Government; The Optimal Policy of an L-Government; Uncertainty.- Conclusions.