The Sources of Intentionality

Hardcover | August 30, 2011

byUriah Kriegel

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What do thoughts, hopes, paintings, words, desires, photographs, traffic signs, and perceptions have in common? They are all about something, are directed, are contentful - in a way chairs and trees, for example, are not. This book inquires into the source of this power of directedness thatsome items exhibit while others do not. An approach to this issue prevalent in the philosophy of the past half-century seeks to explain the power of directedness in terms of certain items' ability to reliably track things in their environment. A very different approach, with a venerable history and enjoying a recent resurgence, seeks toexplain the power of directedness rather in terms of an intrinsic ability of conscious experience to direct itself. This book attempts a synthesis of both approaches, developing an account of the sources of such directedness that grounds it both in reliable tracking and in consciousexperience.

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What do thoughts, hopes, paintings, words, desires, photographs, traffic signs, and perceptions have in common? They are all about something, are directed, are contentful - in a way chairs and trees, for example, are not. This book inquires into the source of this power of directedness thatsome items exhibit while others do not. An app...

Uriah Kriegel is an Asociate Pofessor of Pilosophy at the University of Arizona. His work centers on consciousness and intentionality. His previous book, Subjective Consciousness: A Self-Representational Theory, was published by Oxford University Press in 2009.

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Format:HardcoverDimensions:288 pages, 6.42 × 9.29 × 1.18 inPublished:August 30, 2011Publisher:Oxford University PressLanguage:English

The following ISBNs are associated with this title:

ISBN - 10:0199742979

ISBN - 13:9780199742974

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Table of Contents

Introduction1. The Experiential Origins of Intentionality1.1. The Concept of Intentionality and Anchoring Instances1.1.1. An Anchoring-Instance Model of Natural Kind Concept Formation1.1.2. Application to the Concept of Intentionality1.2. Experiential Intentionality the Anchor1.2.1. An Asymmetry of Ascription1.2.2. Explaining the Asymmetry1.2.3. Objections and Replies 1.3.1.3. 'Experiential Intentionality'1.3.1. Definition1.3.2. Existence1.3.3. Scope2. The Nature of Experiential Intentionality: I. A Higher-Order Tracking Theory2.1. A Tracking Account of Experiential Intentionality?2.1.1. Background: Tracking Theories of Mental Representation2.1.2. Representationalist Theories of Conscious Experience2.1.3. Experiential Tracking2.2. The HOT Argument2.2.1. Background: Higher-Order Theories of Conscious Experience2.2.2. Higher-Order Theory and the Tracking Account of Experiential Intentionality2.3. Experiential Intentionality and Higher-Order Tracking2.4. Objections and Replies2.4.1. 'Intentionality,' 'Representation,' 'Tracking'2.4.2. What do We Want a Theory of Intentionality for?3. The Nature of Experiential Intentionality: II. An Adverbial Theory3.1. Background: Intentional Inexistence and Intentional Indifference3.2. The Argument from Intentional Indifference3.2.1. The Argument3.2.2. Responses3.2.3. Brains in Vats3.3. The Argument from Intentional Inexistence3.3.1. The Argument3.3.2. Responses3.4. Experiential Intentionality as Adverbial Modification3.5. Objections to Adverbialism4. The Nature of Non-Experiential Intentionality: An Interpretivist Theory4.1. Potentialism4.2. Inferentialism4.3. Eliminativism4.4. Interpretivism4.4.1. Interpretivism about Non-Experiential Intentionality4.4.2. Interpretivism Developed4.4.3. Objections and Replies5. Toward a General Theory of Intentionality5.1. Adverbialism plus Interpretivism5.2. Higher-Order Tracking Theory plus InterpretivismReferences