The Two Selves: Their Metaphysical Commitments and Functional Independence

Hardcover | November 6, 2013

byStanley B. Klein

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The Two Selves takes the position that the self is not a "thing" easily reduced to an object of scientific analysis. Rather, the self consists in a multiplicity of aspects, some of which have a neuro-cognitive basis (and thus are amenable to scientific inquiry) while other aspects are bestconstrued as first-person subjectivity, lacking material instantiation. As a consequence of their potential immateriality, the subjective aspect of self cannot be taken as an object and therefore is not easily amenable to treatment by current scientific methods. Klein argues that to fully appreciate the self, its two aspects must be acknowledged, since it is only in virtue of their interaction that the self of everyday experience becomes a phenomenological reality. However, given their different metaphysical commitments (i.e., material and immaterialaspects of reality), a number of issues must be addressed. These include, but are not limited to, the possibility of interaction between metaphysically distinct aspects of reality, questions of causal closure under the physical, and the principle of energy conservation.After addressing these concerns, Klein presents evidence based on self-reports from case studies of individuals who suffer from a chronic or temporary loss of their sense of personal ownership of their mental states. Drawing on this evidence, he argues that personal ownership may be the factor thatcloses the metaphysical gap between the material and immaterial selves, linking these two disparate aspects of reality, thereby enabling us to experience a unified sense of self despite its underlying multiplicity.

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The Two Selves takes the position that the self is not a "thing" easily reduced to an object of scientific analysis. Rather, the self consists in a multiplicity of aspects, some of which have a neuro-cognitive basis (and thus are amenable to scientific inquiry) while other aspects are bestconstrued as first-person subjectivity, lacking...

Stanley B. Klein, PhD, was born in New York City and grew up in Connecticut. A BA graduate of Stanford University with a doctorate from Harvard University, he has taught at University of Illinois, Champaign-Urbana; Trinity University, San Antonio; and University of California Santa Barbara, where he is currently in the Psychology Depar...

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Format:HardcoverDimensions:176 pages, 8.25 × 5.5 × 0.98 inPublished:November 6, 2013Publisher:Oxford University PressLanguage:English

The following ISBNs are associated with this title:

ISBN - 10:0199349967

ISBN - 13:9780199349968

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Table of Contents

Preface1. Introductory Remarks about the Problem of the Self2. The Epistemological Self - the Self of Neural Instantiation3. The Ontological Self - The Self of First-Person Subjectivity4. The Epistemological and Ontological Selves: A Brief "Summing Up"5. Empirical Evidence and the Ontological and Epistemological Selves6. Some Final ThoughtsReferencesIndex