The Value of Living Well by Mark LeBarThe Value of Living Well by Mark LeBar

The Value of Living Well

byMark LeBar

Hardcover | June 11, 2013

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Since the middle of the twentieth century, virtue ethics has enriched the range of philosophical approaches to normative ethics, often drawing on the work of the ancient Greeks, who offered accounts of the virtues that have become part of contemporary philosophical ethics. But these virtueethical theories were situated within a more general picture of human practical rationality, one which maintained that to understand virtue we must appeal to what would make our lives go well. This feature of ethical theorizing has not become part of philosophical ethics, although the virtuetheories dependent upon it have.This book is an attempt to bring eudaimonism into dialogue with contemporary philosophical work in ethical theory. It does not attempt to replicate the many contributions to normative ethics, in particular to thinking about the virtues. Instead, it attempts to contribute to metatethics - to thinkingabout what we are doing when we think about normative ethics. In particular, it attempts to contribute to contemporary philosophical debate on the nature of what is good for us, on what we have most reason to do, on what facts about both those ideas consist in, on the nature of values and valuefacts, and the nature of the reasons for respect for others we might have. Its aim is to mark off space in these debates where a way of thinking about ourselves and our agential, practical, natures as the ancients did can enrich our thinking about those deep and important questions. In this way thebook makes a case for what we might call Virtue Eudaimonism.
Mark LeBar is Associate Professor of Philosophy at Ohio University.
Title:The Value of Living WellFormat:HardcoverDimensions:384 pages, 9.25 × 6.12 × 0.98 inPublished:June 11, 2013Publisher:Oxford University PressLanguage:English

The following ISBNs are associated with this title:

ISBN - 10:0199931119

ISBN - 13:9780199931118

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Table of Contents

IntroductionPart One1. Aristotle on Ends1.1 Human life and agency1.2 Ends1.2.1 Ends as constraints1.2.2 Ends, reasons, and "for the sake of which"1.3 The Aristotelian framework1.4 Unhelpful friends1.5 Scanlon2. Challenges to the Structure2.1 No Ultimate End2.2 Long-chains views2.3 The looping model2.4 The real challenge to the Aristotelian framework2.5 Pseudo pluralism2.6 Political pluralism2.7 Telic pluralism2.8 What the failure of telic pluralism teaches us2.9 Relative monism3. Living Well3.1 Ancient argument about our Ultimate End3.2 Begin with agency3.2.1 Subordinating patiency3.3 First nature3.4 Second nature3.5 The VE proposal4. Succeeding as Rational and Social Animals4.1 The contribution of rationality4.1.1 End-setting4.1.2 Judgment in action4.1.3 Training the passions4.2 Sociality4.2.1 Sociality and shared ends4.2.2 Caring for others4.2.3 The agent-relativity of welfare and care4.2.4 Living well in community4.3 Individual difference4.4 Autonomy4.5 Objections4.5.1 Misconceptions4.5.2 Virtue's commitmentsPart Two5. Constructivism5.1 Motivation for the approach5.2 Taxonomy: Constructivism and realism5.3 Recognitionalism: Evidence for and against5.3.1 Rational recognition5.3.2 Reversal of values and conditional value5.3.2.3 Constructivism in Aristotle: the Doctrine of the Mean5.3.3 VR reconsidered5.3.4 The constructed value of unconditional goods5.4 Practical rationality, agency and activity5.4.1 Background: realism5.4.2 Action guidance5.4.3 The failure of recognitionalism5.4.4 Naturalism5.5 Particularism and recognitionalism6. General and Particular6.1 The basic argument6.2 The problem in Kant6.2.1 The problem in Korsgaard6.2.2 The problem in Herman6.2.3 The problem in O'Neill6.3 The problem for generalist Constructivism6.4 Recognitionalist Particularism7. Fitting Judgment7.1 First-person, third-person7.1.1 Case in point7.2 Constructivism particularism - an overview7.3 Conditions of judgment7.4 Fittingness7.4.1 The fitting in Aristotle7.4.2 The fitting in Samuel Clarke7.4.3 The fitting in later theorists7.5 Fittingness as a normative standard for judgment7.5.1 The fittingness relation7.5.2 What is fitted to conditions7.5.3 Fittingness, the good life, and comparability7.5.4 Examples8. Critical Assessment8.1 Evaluation, supervenience, and justification8.1.1 The nature of supervenience in detail8.1.2 Supervenience - explanation8.1.3 Supervenience - application8.2 Publicity8.3 The relation between standpoints8.4 Objectivity and subjectivityPart Three9. Response-Dependent Value9.1 Reasons, ends, and value9.2 Early response-dependence accounts9.2.1 McDowell9.2.2 Wiggins9.3 Value: Concept vs. Property9.4 Response-dependent value9.4.1 Responses9.4.2 Subjects9.4.3 Conditions10. Objections to Response-Dependent Value10.1 Subjects of the value relation10.2 Response-dependent value: backdrop for the problem10.3 Response-dependent value: the problem motivated10.4 Floating reference: a cautionary note10.5 Relativism11. Other issues11.1 The circularity11.2 Cuneo on practical wisdom11.3 Hussain and Shah's dilemma11.4 Euthyphro dilemmas11.4.1 Shafer-Landau's dilemma11.4.2 Timmons' dilemma11.5 Timmons on moral symmetry11.6 Moral psychology12. Respect for Others12.1 Expressions of the target idea12.2 The problem in a cartoon12.3 First step at solution12.3.1 Constructing reasons for respect12.3.2 Respect and rights12.3.3 VE's analysis of claims12.3.4 VE's analysis of other rights12.3.5 Respect and living well12.3.6 THe extent of respect12.3.7 Two Kantian notes12.4 Revisiting the concern12.4.1 Wrong Attitudes12.4.2 The two-level structure12.4.3 Fit with ordinary practice