Unbelievable Errors: An Error Theory about All Normative Judgements by Bart StreumerUnbelievable Errors: An Error Theory about All Normative Judgements by Bart Streumer

Unbelievable Errors: An Error Theory about All Normative Judgements

byBart Streumer

Hardcover | August 25, 2017

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Unbelievable Errors defends an error theory about all normative judgements: not just moral judgements, but also judgements about reasons for action, judgements about reasons for belief, and instrumental normative judgements. This theory states that normative judgements are beliefs that ascribenormative properties, but that normative properties do not exist. It therefore entails that all normative judgements are false. Bart Streumer also argues, however, that we cannot believe this error theory. This may seem to be a problem for the theory. But he argues that it makes this error theory more likely to be true, since it undermines objections to the theory and it makes it harder to reject the arguments for thetheory. He then sketches how certain other philosophical theories can be defended in a similar way. He concludes that to make philosophical progress, we need to make a sharp distinction between a theory's truth and our ability to believe it.
Bart Streumer is Professor of Philosophy at the University of Groningen. He previously taught at the University of Reading. His work on metaethics has appeared in the Journal of Philosophy, Philosophical Studies, and the Australasian Journal of Philosophy.
Title:Unbelievable Errors: An Error Theory about All Normative JudgementsFormat:HardcoverDimensions:256 pages, 8.5 × 5.31 × 0 inPublished:August 25, 2017Publisher:Oxford University PressLanguage:English

The following ISBNs are associated with this title:

ISBN - 10:0198785895

ISBN - 13:9780198785897

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Table of Contents

1. Normative Judgements and Properties2. The Reduction Argument3. Further Versions of the Reduction Argument4. The False Guarantee and Regress Objections5. Further Defences of Realism6. The Symmetry Objection7. Further Views8. The Error Theory9. Believing the Error Theory10. Reason to Believe the Error Theory11. Objections, Rejection, Revision12. Effects, Parallels, ProgressConclusion