Understanding General Deterrence: Theory And Application

Hardcover | October 15, 2011

byStephen L. Quackenbush

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Bridging the divide between formal and quantitative studies of deterrence by empirically testing and extending perfect deterrence theory, this book makes an important contribution by focusing on general deterrence, which relates to managing relations between states at all times, not only during crises. This distinction is important because understanding general deterrence is more important than understanding immediate deterrence, and because empirical analyses of immediate deterrence can be misleading due to selection effects. In a series of formal and quantitative analyses, the author tests perfect deterrence theory, develops a new three-party game of extended deterrence, and applies the theory to explain recurrent conflict.

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Bridging the divide between formal and quantitative studies of deterrence by empirically testing and extending perfect deterrence theory, this book makes an important contribution by focusing on general deterrence, which relates to managing relations between states at all times, not only during crises. This distinction is important bec...

Stephen L. Quackenbush is an associate professor of Political Science at the University of Missouri. His research focuses on international conflict, deterrence, and game theory. Specific areas of interest include bridging the divide between formal and quantitative studies of deterrence, the impact of conflict settlements and outcomes ...

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Format:HardcoverDimensions:220 pages, 8.61 × 5.68 × 0.7 inPublished:October 15, 2011Publisher:Palgrave MacmillanLanguage:English

The following ISBNs are associated with this title:

ISBN - 10:0230115047

ISBN - 13:9780230115040

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Table of Contents

Understanding General Deterrence * General Deterrence Case Selection * Testing Perfect Deterrence Theory * Three-Party Extended Deterrence * Settlements, Deterrence, and Recurrent Conflict * Appendix A: FORTRAN Program Used to Determine Active Dyads * Appendix B: Subgame Perfect Equilibria of Three-Party Extended Deterrence Game * Appendix C: Perfect Bayesian Equilibria of Three-Party Extended Deterrence Game

Editorial Reviews

“This is the most sophisticated and ambitious book to be written on the elusive topic of general deterrence that I am aware of. Stephen L. Quackenbush masterfully integrates formal theory with quantitative empirical tests in a probing and rigorous analysis that generates many insights into the onset of military confrontations, the reliability of alliances, and the durability of conflict settlements. This book is essential reading for all scholars of deterrence and international conflict.”--Paul Huth, University of Maryland “A tour de force of theory development and testing. In this highly innovative work, Stephen L. Quackenbush pushes hard at the frontiers of theoretical knowledge about the dynamics of deterrence. Along the way he confronts head on a number of thorny methodological issues that have plagued previous empirical studies and offers compelling solutions to them. The next wave of scholarship on deterrence will have to start here.”--Frank C. Zagare, University at Buffalo, SUNY “Understanding General Deterrence is a significant contribution to the study of international conflict processes. Quackenbush succeeds in bridging the longstanding gap between formal and quantitative analysis of general deterrence. His clear and well-organized exposition reaches that goal in a number of ways. The concept of politically active dyads is developed and applied effectively to deal with the problem of identifying opportunity in general deterrence. On the game-theoretic side, the modeling of all three actors in extended deterrence provides the most rigorous and complete treatment of the question to date. This and other stages of the work produce ideas beyond intuition; for example, under extended deterrence, the likely target of an attack by a challenger is the more reliable of the defending allies, with the goal being to keep the less reliable ally on the sideline and prevent a multilateral war. The well-integrated theorizing, data analysis, and case illustrations in this study culminate in a fascinating range of implications for foreign policy. This work will encourage renewed interest in general deterrence, which Quackenbush demonstrates to be relevant to the management and resolution of any number of other issues.”--Patrick James, University of Southern California