Weakness of Will and Practical Irrationality by Sarah StroudWeakness of Will and Practical Irrationality by Sarah Stroud

Weakness of Will and Practical Irrationality

EditorSarah Stroud, Christine Tappolet

Paperback | March 4, 2008

Pricing and Purchase Info


Earn 399 plum® points

Prices and offers may vary in store


In stock online

Ships free on orders over $25

Not available in stores


Among the many practical failures that threaten us, weakness of will or akrasia is often considered to be a paradigm of irrationality. The eleven new essays in this collection, written by an excellent international team of philosophers, some well-established, some younger scholars, give a richoverview of the current debate over weakness of will and practical irrationality more generally. Issues covered include classical questions such as the distinction between weakness and compulsion, the connection between evaluative judgement and motivation, the role of emotions in akrasia, rationalagency, and the existence of the will. The also include new topics, such as group akrasia, strength of will, the nature of correct choice, the structure of decision theory, the temporality of prudential reasons, and emotional rationality. Because these questions cut across philosophy of mind andethics, the collection will be essential reading for scholars, postgraduates, and upper-level undergraduates in both these fields.
Sarah Stroud is Professor in the Department of Philosophy at McGill University in Canada. Christine Tappolet is Professor in the Department of Philosophy at the University of Montreal in Canada.
Title:Weakness of Will and Practical IrrationalityFormat:PaperbackDimensions:328 pages, 9.21 × 6.14 × 0.79 inPublished:March 4, 2008Publisher:Oxford University PressLanguage:English

The following ISBNs are associated with this title:

ISBN - 10:0199235953

ISBN - 13:9780199235957

Look for similar items by category:


Table of Contents

Sarah Stroud and Christine Tappolet: Introduction1. Michael Smith: Rational Capacities, or: How to Distinguish Recklessness, Weakness, and Compulsion2. Richard Holton: How is Strength of Will Possible?3. Philip Pettit: Akrasia, Collective and Individual4. Christine Tappolet: Emotions and the Intelligibility of Akratic Action5. Sarah Stroud: Weakness of Will and Practical Judgement6. Sergio Tenenbaum: Accidie, Evaluation, and Motivation7. Gary Watson: The Work of the Will8. Ralph Wedgwood: Choosing Rationally and Choosing Correctly9. Duncan MacIntosh: Prudence and the Temporal Structure of Practical Reasons10. Joseph Heath: Practical Irrationality and the Structure of Decision Theory11. Ronald de Sousa: Paradoxical Emotion: On sui generis Emotional Irrationality

Editorial Reviews

`... an attractive volume ... [which] represents an important contribution to action theory, philosophy of mind and moral psychology, and should be read by anyone who works in these areas.'Journal of Moral Philosophy