Doing without Concepts: Why Cognition Is Not Unified

deEdouard Machery

|anglais
9 février 2009|
Doing without Concepts: Why Cognition Is Not Unified de Edouard Machery
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Over recent years, the psychology of concepts has been rejuvenated by new work on prototypes, inventive ideas on causal cognition, the development of neo-empiricist theories of concepts, and the inputs of the budding neuropsychology of concepts. But our empirical knowledge about concepts has yet to be organized in a coherent framework. In Doing without Concepts, Edouard Machery argues that the dominant psychological theories of concepts fail to provide such a framework and that drastic conceptual changes are required to make sense of the research on concepts in psychology and neuropsychology. Machery shows that the class of concepts divides into several distinct kinds that have little in common with one another and that for this very reason, it is a mistake to attempt to encompass all known phenomena within a single theory of concepts. In brief, concepts are not a natural kind. Machery concludes that the theoretical notion of concept should be eliminated from the theoretical apparatus of contemporary psychology and should be replaced with theoretical notions that are more appropriate for fulfilling psychologists'' goals. The notion of concept has encouraged psychologists to believe that a single theory of concepts could be developed, leading to useless theoretical controversies between the dominant paradigms of concepts. Keeping this notion would slow down, and maybe prevent, the development of a more adequate classification and would overshadow the theoretical and empirical issues that are raised by this more adequate classification. Anyone interested in cognitive science''s emerging view of the mind will find Machery''s provocative ideas of interest.
Edouard Machery is an Assistant Professor of Philosophy at the University of Pittsburgh.
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Titre :Doing without Concepts: Why Cognition Is Not Unified
Format :Couverture rigide
Dimensions de l'article :304 pages, 9.25 X 6.13 X 0.98 po
Dimensions à l'expédition :304 pages, 9.25 X 6.13 X 0.98 po
Publié le :9 février 2009
Publié par :Oxford University Press
Langue :anglais
Convient aux âges :Tous les âges
ISBN - 13 :9780195306880

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