Working Without a Net: A Study of Egocentric Epistemology by Richard FoleyWorking Without a Net: A Study of Egocentric Epistemology by Richard Foley

Working Without a Net: A Study of Egocentric Epistemology

byRichard Foley

Hardcover | January 1, 1992

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In this new book, Foley defends an epistemology that takes seriously the perspectives of individual thinkers. He argues that having rational opinions is a matter of meeting our own internal standards rather than standards that are somehow imposed upon us from the outside. It is a matter ofmaking ourselves invulnerable to intellectual self-criticism. Foley also shows how the theory of rational belief is part of a general theory of rationality. He thus avoids treating the rationality of belief as a fundamentally different kind of phenomenon from the rationality of decision or action. His approach generates promising suggestions about a wide range of issues--e.g., the distinction between epistemic and non-epistemic reasons for belief; the question of what aspects of the Cartesian project are still worth doing; the significance of simplicity and other theoretical virtues; therelevance of skeptical hypotheses; the difference between a theory of rational belief and a theory of knowledge; the difference between a theory of rational belief and a theory of rational degrees of belief; and the limits of idealization in epistemology.
Richard Foley is at Rutgers University.
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Title:Working Without a Net: A Study of Egocentric EpistemologyFormat:HardcoverDimensions:224 pages, 9.57 × 6.38 × 0.91 inPublished:January 1, 1992Publisher:Oxford University Press

The following ISBNs are associated with this title:

ISBN - 10:0195076990

ISBN - 13:9780195076998

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From Our Editors

In this book, Richard Foley defends an epistemology that takes seriously the perspectives of individual thinkers. He argues that having rational opinions is a matter of meeting our own internal standards rather than standards that are somehow imposed upon us from the outside. It is a matter of making ourselves invulnerable to intellectual self-criticism. Foley also shows how the theory of rational belief is part of a general theory of rationality. He thus avoids treating the rationality of belief as a fundamentally different kind of phenomenon from the rationality of decision or action. His approach generates promising suggestions about a wide range of issues, e.g., the distinction between epistemic and non-epistemic reasons for belief; the question of what aspects of the Cartesian project are still worth doing; the significance of simplicity and other theoretical virtues; the relevance of skeptical hypotheses; the difference between a theory of rational belief and a theory of knowledge; the difference between a theory of rational belief and a theory of rational d

Editorial Reviews

"An important contribution to a wide range of fundamental issues in epistemology. It is certain to have the same kind of significant impact made by his earlier book The Theory of Rationality and must be read by any philosopher who takes epistemological questions seriously....Foley has thatrare philosophical trait of doggedly pursuing the truth wherever it leads, without ideological baggage and with no interest in dialectically clever maneuvers that avoid the heart of philosophical controversies. If you are interested in a clear, careful, unpretentious, but sophisticated approach tothe study of epistemology, you must not overlook this book."--The Philosophical Review